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This paper focuses on the experience of the transition countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and Central Asia in providing adequate  safety nets for the poor during the last 10
years.  The paper discusses the problem of poverty and vulnerability - who were the poor,
and how did the answer to this question change over the decade,  it looks at the typical
types of interventions offered by governments,  and how this package changed over the
period.  It surveys the evidence on effectiveness of these programs in reaching the poor, in
reducing their income poverty, or reducing other aspects of poverty (e.g. social exclusion).
The results are quite striking, as in all countries, classic targeted safety net policies played
a small role in reducing poverty.  In part, this was because of the uniqueness of the period
- conventional  good practice was not always applicable.
Recently,  several countries in the region have improved the coverage  and targeting of their
programs, offer good models for other countries.  If all middle income countries in the
region adopted these models, including insuring adequate financing, effective poverty
reduction at low cost is possible.  Financing for this benefit could come from reducing
expenditures on untargeted categorical benefits and energy subsidies.  Low income
countries may find that implementing  a full means-tested cash benefit system is too costly
and administratively  complex, although it should be noted that Armenia and Albania have
both implemented programs successfully.  These countries may wish to try less complex
solutions such as distributing food rations through schools or school feeding programs.
Fee waivers or subsidies to improve access to social services  for the poor could also be
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In their purest  form,  "transition  economies"  are  a  unique feature  of the last  decade of the
twentieth  century.  The term most  commonly  applies  to  the  countries  of the former Soviet
Union  and those of Eastern  and Central  Europe that were in the so-called  "Soviet block,"'
and relates to the changes in economic  and social structure that were released  by the fall of
the Berlin wall in the summer of 1989  and the subsequent  break-up  of the Soviet Union in
1991-92. The transitions are usually considered to be of two types:
*  The  transition  from  a  fully  planned  economy,  with primarily  state  ownership  of
production,  to  a  market  economy,  with primarily private  ownership  of assets  and
market-supporting  economic institutions.
*  The transition  from a single-party state linked in significant economic  and political
(security) relationships  with the Soviet Union, to a state with more open and global
trade  relations  and  another  political  system.  In  most  of the European  transition
countries, this transition is explicitly intended to be toward a pluralistic democracy,
leading to close linkages with Western Europe (including accession to the European
Union  for at  least  10  countries),  while in  other  countries,  the end  point is not  as
clear.
In a broader sense, the universe of transition economies is wider. A number of countries
in Asia and Africa have also been engaged in one or both of these transitions.  China and Viet
Nam,  for  example,  began  the  move  toward  a  more  open  economy  and  more  private
ownership  even  earlier,  while Mongolia  began  its  own  transition  at  the same time  as  the
CECA countries.  Several countries in East Africa, for example, are making similar economic
transitions  toward  more  private  ownership  and  a  more  open  trading  and  pricing  regime.
These countries are generally not considered in the same group as the transition countries of
CECA.  However,  they have  faced  some  of the  same problems.  Indeed  after  a  decade  of
economic  decline  (often  exacerbated  by  armed  conflict),  some  of  the  lowest-income
transition  economies  of CECA  may  have  more  in common  with  low-income  developing
countries than with their more well-to-do neighbors.
' A number of terms have been coined to describe this large, heterogeneous  group of countries, linked primarily
through their political alliance with the  Soviet Union. Throughout this paper we will refer to these countries  as
the Central and Eastern European and Cental Asian countries (CECA countries).
ISeveral  aspects of the transition in the CECA countries  are  exceptional,  however,  and
set these  countries  apart.  First, all countries  experienced  a common shock-the  collapse of
trading relationships,  which administered  a major shock to their economies.  The reasons this
shock was so difficult in these  countries (especially those  from the former Soviet Union) are
the  speed  cf change,  which was  unexpectedly  fast with highly negative  consequences;  and
the high  level of industrialization  based  on  economic  specialization  by country  compared
with other (developing countries undertaking transitions to a more market-oriented  system. In
CECA  countries  (compared  with  China and  Viet Nam,  for  example),  there was  little that
improvedl  performance  in the  agricultural  sector  could  do  to cushion  the shock,  and  little
surplus  to  take  from  agriculture  to  finance  the  needed  investment  in  the  new  economy.
Considered  in this  light, the transition  economies  of CECA  are indeed distinctive,  and their
experience  of the last ten years was a unique one in economic and social history.
Second,  although  the countries  are  ethnically  quite  different,  all  began  the  transition
with similar institutions, modeled  for the most part  on Soviet practice.  These included high
levels  of urbanization  (often  accelerated  through  the  creation  of company  towns  in  the
periods  of most intensive  industrialization)  with an associated  large wage  economy,  which
was  the basis for a broad social  insurance program;  and a large social service infrastructure
with a common approach  to social service delivery including the provision of social welfare
services.  This implied  that they  started  the transition  with  above-average  social indicators
given their incomes,  including high levels of education,  low levels  of inequality,  and  high
expectations  regarding the  government's  role in reducing risk.  These initial conditions  put
these countries in a group of their own compared with the rest of the middle- and low-income
developing world.
This paper focuses  on the  experience of the countries  of CECA in providing  adequate
safety nets'  for the poor during the transition period. It is for the most part a stock-taking,  as
throughout the last decade both the scope of the problem as well as policy and programmatic
responses hLave been evolving quickly. We begin by reviewing (briefly)  the economic history
of the transition-output  decline  and recovery.  We  then turn to discussing the problem  of
poverty  and vulnerability-who  were  the poor,  and  how  did  the  answer  to  this  question
change  over  the  decade?  Following  what  has  now become  the  convention  (World  Bank
2000b,  2002b)  in analyzing  transition  economies,  we  divide  the countries  into the higher-
income  European  pre-accession  countries  and remaining the  lower-income  countries  of the
CIS  and  Southern  Europe.  Next we  look  at the  typical  types  of interventions  offered  by
governments, and how this package changed over the period.  We then survey the evidence on
2  The  term  "safety  nets"  has  multiple  meanings.  In  a  recent  paper,  Beasley,  et  al.  defined  it  as  "public
interventions  which  are  designed  to  serve  two  key  functions:  (i)  to  play  a  redistributive  role  transferring
resources  towards  the  poorer  members  of society  to  bring  them  out  of poverty,  (ii)  to  provide  greater
opportunities  for  individuals  to  mitigate  risks  from  unforeseen  contingencies."  (p.  4,  2001).  This  definition
includes both social  assistance  and social  insurance,  as well  as  a range  of social  services.  In this  paper,  we
choose  a more narrow  focus.  We exclude social insurance  for the most part,  as this topic already  has  a broad
literature,  and1  focus  instead  on  transfers  to households  from governments  which  do  not have  an insurance
character but are meant to provide or substitute for income-cash transfers, food stamnps,  food-related programs
where  the  implicit  income  transfer  is  important,  labor-intensive  public  works  done  to  provide  self-targeted
transfers through wages, and so on. Mechanisms  to provide  fee waivers, vouchers,  or scholarships for services
deemed essential but for which charges usually  apply will be included-scholarships  for school, mechanisms to
waive  fees for health care  services,  or  for heatmg  in cold climates.  We  exclude  most  social services,  but we
include  social  care  services  since  in  CECA  countries  these  are  often  a  (poor)  substitute  for  transfers  to
households.
2effectiveness of the safety net programs in reaching the poor, reducing their income poverty,
or reducing  other aspects of poverty (e.g.,  social exclusion). The results are quite striking, as
in  all  countries,  classic  targeted  safety net policies  played  a smaller  role  than expected  in
reducing poverty.  In part,  this was because  of the uniqueness  of the period-targeting was
not easy. We conclude with some lessons from this experience,  which may be helpful for the
countries  still  struggling with the transition,  as  well as  for other countries,  including  those
still hoping to make a transition.
Economic  Performance during the Transition, the Plight of Households,
and the Policy Response
Economic  performance  during the first  10 years  of the  transition was characterized  by two
main events3:
*  An  output  shock,  caused primarily  by disruption  in trade  and financial  links,  and
falling terms  of trade,  but also by regional  conflicts  and declining  world demand.
This output shock was usually accompanied by a bout of inflation resulting from the
financial repression preceding the transition.
*  An eventual recovery,  led by private sector growth,  especially in the service sector
(which had been repressed  during the planned  economy  period),  and a rebound  in
exports as countries were able to reorient supply to the demand from the West.
Variations among countries. In the  richer,  pre-accession  countries,  the  output  decline
was shorter,  lasting on average 3.8 years, with a cumulative output decline of 22 percent  on
average. By 2000, gross domestic product  (GDP) in most of these countries had recovered to
1990  levels. In some countries  (Romania,  Poland, Hungary), 2000 GDP was well  above the
1990 level. The mix of production had changed, however,  as industry shrank from 45 percent
of value  added to 33 percent, with the service sector picking up the slack.  The private sector
share of GDP in these countries  ranged from 60-80 percent of GDP by 2000.  Most of these
countries  experienced  a very active  and volatile  labor market, with significant job creation
and destruction.  By the  end of the decade,  over half of employment  was  in the small  and
medium enterprise (SME)  sector in most of these countries.  In all countries except the Czech
Republic  (which had slower  growth),  employment  growth lagged behind GDP growth.  For
example,  in Hungary,  after rising to nearly  12 percent,  unemployment  fell back to  about  9
percent, where it remained for the second half of the decade,  and long-term unemployment  is
an issue (World Bank 2001b). Wages initially fell, but by 2000 in most countries the average
wage was near or above the 1990 level.
In the poorer countries of the CIS, as well as the conflict-ridden countries  of the former
Yugoslavia,  the  story  is  different-and  worse.  The  output  decline  lasted  on  average  6.5
years, with a cumulative decline of 50 percent of GDP on average. Conflict-ridden  countries
such as Moldova, Armenia,  and Azerbaijan lost over 60 percent of GDP, and Georgia lost 78
percent.  By  2000,  GDP  had recovered  to  on  average  63  percent  of  1990  levels,  but  in
Georgia  GDP only recovered  to  29 percent,  and  in Moldova it only reached  35 percent  of
1990  levels.  Product  mix changed  in these  countries  as well,  with services  growing to  50
percent  of GDP,  and  industry  and  agriculture  declining.  The  high service  share  in  these
3  The facts and analysis in this section are taken from World Bank (2002g).
3countries  reflects  in part the growth of the informal  sector, which has grown much faster in
poorer countries  (Rashid  and Rutkowski  2001). The private  sector share of GDP was  a bit
smaller on  average  than in the richer countries  (50 percent compared  with an average of 68
percent in the richer) but, more importantly, the variance is much larger, ranging from 20-30
percent in EBelarus and Turkmnenistan to 70 percent in Russia. The share of employment in the
SME sector is on average smaller (around 20 percent, even in countries  such as Russia with a
larger pnvate  sector). Both of these trends reflected  slow and incomplete restructuring of the
state  sector.  Importantly,  employment  has  not  fallen  as  fast  as  GDP  in  most  of these
countries,  although  wages  have  declined  sharply.  For  example,  in  Moldova  and  Russia,
wages  irt  1998  were  still  less  than  40  percent  of the  1990  level.  Often,  employment  was
nominal  at  best,  as  wage  arrears  and  wage  non-payment  (even  these  low  wages)  was
common.  Ihis  phenomenon,  known  as  labor  hoarding,  partially  reflected  use of the  state
sector as employer of last resort (Rashid and Rutkowski  2001) but it also reflected the lack of
alternative  employment  opportunities,  as  private  sector  growth  was not  as  rapid  and  not
creating jobs  as effectively  as in the richer countries.  Unemployment  (defined  according  to
International  Labour Organisation  standards) is not regularly measured. Fragmentary data for
countries  such  as  Russia,  Ukraine,  and  Moldova  register  double-digit  levels,  without  the
decline observed in the richer countries (Rashid and Rutkowski 2001).
Effects  on people. The  effects on households of these economic  swings were dramatic.
Under  central  planning,  the  command  economy promised  cradle-to-grave  income  security.
Consumption  levels not really "standards" but more how people  lived may have been low,
but they were secure.  There were three legs to the system:
*  Benefits  in kind:  low-cost housing  and  utilities,  cheap  transportation,  and  almost
free social services such as childcare, education, and health care. There were quality
issues but few access problems;4
*  A guaranteed job; and
*  Cash payments  to households  to  support  dependents-child  benefits and pensions
to  support the disabled and the aging (the latter defined very liberally).  There were
also  a range of special subsidies  for  various  groups  (either needy  groups  such  as
disabled veterans or groups deemed to be of particular merit such as party officials).
The  transition  affected  all  three  legs.  The  drop  in income  and  the  development  of a
market  economy  knocked  out  the  guaranteed job.  The  fiscal  crisis  that resulted  from  the
income  decline  and  initial  difficulties  in collecting  taxes  from  the non-state  sector  forced
large cuts in (a) and (c). As a result, households  became at once poorer and more vulnerable.
The vulnerability was exacerbated  by the  loss of financial  savings, wiped  out by the initial
bout of hyperinflation  and/or by subsequent banking  system crises.  While  most households
were able to retain their housing (their main source of wealth, and not a liquid one since there
was no housing market),  some households were forced to sell their consumer durables at low
prices  in order to survive.  Households  also  suffered  serious  social and psychological  costs,
caused by the destruction of "normal  life" (World Bank 2000b).  Surveys reported  isolation,
shame, and feelings of worthlessness that despite their education  and hard work,  they could
4  While access  was broadly  universal,  rationing through queuing  took  place,  for example,  for housing.  Good
political connections could affect time in the queue as well as quality of service.
4not  find  a job  that paid  adequately-or  even  any job  at  all.  This  was  reflected  in  such
indicators as rising divorce, alcoholism, suicide, morbidity, and mortality.
What did  governments do to support households? Governments were severely limited in
what they could do because  of the  transition-induced  fiscal  crisis.  Governments  needed  in
any case to scale back their size and scope to a level more consistent with a market economy,
but the fall in output imposed  an even greater cut in  a short amount  of time.  For the richer
countries,  expenditures  as a share  of GDP  stabilized  in the range of about  40 percent,  but
poorer  countries  not  only  lost  large  chunks  of output,  but  revenues  as  a  share  of the
remaining output shrunk  as well, to levels more common in very low-income  countries (e.g.,
in Georgia, 9 percent of GDP).
Most governments followed four main policy lines:
*  To  help  the  unemployed,  they  instituted  a  system  of  payroll  tax-financed
unemployment  benefits (linked to the average  wage,  so  as wages  fell, this benefit
fell  as  well)  and employment  services.  Early retirement  was  also  encouraged-a
policy which turned out to be very costly.
*  To help pensioners,  they tried to protect pensions, spending 7-15 percent of GDP on
this item.  As a result, during the bout of hyperinflation  in the initial years,  average
pensions in all countries fell less than wages. As countries stabilized, average wages
overtook  average  pensions  in  some  countries,  but  spending  remained  high.
However,  in  the  poorest  countries,  pensions  were  sometimes  not  even  paid  as
arrears built up.
*  To help households, they raised housing and utility costs slowly (essentially forcing
utility  companies  to run losses which were  eventually covered by depreciation  of
capital,  reduced  expenditures  on service  (resulting in problem,  such  as blackouts
and brown outs),  and by subsidies  (to failing  companies),  and offered vouchers to
help tenants buy their housing. They cut back on social services offered (e.g., state-
run kindergartens),  but  they  resisted  imposing  costs  for  social  services  although
informal  payments  to  service  providers  increased  substantially.5 They kept  child
allowances,  although  at  a reduced  level,  and  some countries  began  to  means-test
them.  Some kept  the "merit" transfers  as well.  Sick and maternity  leave programs
from the planned economy period were retained for those employed in the covered
sector (state enterprises,  government, and large firms).
*  They  introduced  various  forms  of welfare  payments-some  means-tested,  some
categorical,  some  nationally  administered,  some  locally  administered.  They  also
increased  offerings  of  residential  care,  and  as  a  result  the  number  of
institutionalized children and adults increased rapidly (Tobis 2000).
In terms of the share of expenditures-financing  for publicly provided services  (health,
education,  utilities}-was  usually the  largest  expenditure,  as these  were  in any case  often
wage  and  other  payments  to  state-owned  entities.  Next  came  pensions.6 The next  largest
share  was  often  expenditures  on unemployment  benefits,  with  direct  welfare  services  the
smallest.  Many  countries  spent  more  on  institutional  care  (for less  than 4  percent  of the
5 See Lewis (2000) for an analysis of this issue.
6 See Fox (1997)  for a review of this issue.
5population)  than they did on cash transfers to poor households.  In  1999,  for example,  it is
estimated  that  Russia  spent  50 percent  more on residential  care  than on  social  assistance
benefits  (including  Chernobyl  victim  assistance)  and  child  allowances  combined  (World
Bank 2002c).
Whnt happened to poverty?7 As is well known, poverty  increased in all countries,  even
the  most  successful  economic  reformers.  In  the  countries  with  the  biggest  income  fall,
poverty  went  through  the roof.  In  1990,  an estimated  1.5  percent  of the population  in the
region lived  on less than $1  a day. By  1998,  5.1  percent of the population had fallen below
this  internalional  poverty standard  (World Bank 2000b.  Using the standard of $2.15  a day
(1993  PPP  dollars)-a  more  reasonable  standard  given  the  higher  costs  for  minimum
consumption owing to the cold climate--poverty increased in the region from 2 percent to 28
percent  between  1988  and  1998.  Poverty rates  varied substantially,  however  (see  table  1),
with predictably higher rates in the lower-income countries.
Inequality also increased substantially,  especially in the lower-income countries (Table 1).
Some  increase  in inequality  was  expected,  as  the planned  economy had  compressed  wages
substantially.  This wage compression was, in the long term, inconsistent with open borders and
a free labor market. But increases in inequality were not correlated with the intensity of market
reforms.  On the contrary,  they tended to be higher in the partial reformers, reflecting  "capture"
of the formerly public  assets  by an elite group  and the  increase  in corruption  (World Bank
2000a  and  UNICEF  2001).  For poverty,  the  effects  of the  inequality  increase  have  been
negative for several reasons. First, in the high-inequality countries, it may be reducing growth.
Second,  the inequality  increase  amplifies the negative effect on poverty of the output decline
and reduces the recovery's positive effect on poverty.  This is why, even in the fastest growing
economies,  poverty is still higher than before the transition.  Third, growing inequality appears
to have increased the psychological  costs of poverty.8
An important  aspect  of the nature of poverty in the transition  is that is it seems to be
quite  transient-households  tend  to  cycle  in  and  out  of poverty.  Many households  were
subject  to  large  income  shocks.  As  they  had  little  savings  or liquid  assets,  these  shocks
translated directly into expenditure shocks-consumption smoothing was not possible.  Using
panel data,  investigators  found  that, in Russia,  45 percent of households  were poor at least
once in a four-year  period, but only 3.4 percent were poor in all four years (Luttmer 2000,
cited in  World  Bank 2000b).  In Poland,  similar  analysis  showed  32  percent  poor  at  least
once, but only 6 percent poor in all four years. In Hungary,  the numbers were  9 percent  and
26 percent.  Even in poor Georgia,  over 80 percent of the population escape poverty over the
course of a year (World Bank 1999b).
7 This  povert)  section is taken from World Bank (2000b).  See  the same  source for an extensive discussion of
the measurement issues.
8  The high psychological  costs of poverty in the transition are well documented  in a series of qualitative  studies
of poverty  commissioned  by  the  World  Bank  and others.  These are  summarized  and cited  in  World  Bank
(2000b).
6Table  1: Absolute Poverty Rate and Evolution of Income Inequality During the Transition
Absolute  poverty  Gini coefficientfor income per  capita
headcount
Country  ($2.15/day)f  1987-90  1993-94  1996-99
Central  Europe
Czech Republic  0.0  0.19  0.23  0.25
Hungary  1.3  0.21  0.23  0.25
Slovak Republic  2.6  - -
Slovenia  0.0  0.22  0.29  0.25
Poland  1.2  0.28  0.28  0.33
Southeastern  Europe
Albania  11.5  - - 0.27
Bulgaria  3.1  0.23  0.38  0.41
Croatia  0.2  0.36  - 0.35
Macedonia, FYR  6.7  - - 0.37
Romania  6.8  0.23  0.29  0.30
Baltics  .
Lithuania  3.1  0.23  0.33  0.34
Latvia  6.6  0.24  0.31  0.32
Estonia  2.1  0.24  0.35  0.37
Slavic countries
Russian Federation  18.8  0.26  0.48  0.47
Ukraine  3.0  0.24  0.47  0.33
Moldova  55.4  0.27  - 0.42
Belarus  1.0  0.23  0.28'  0.28
Caucasus and Central  Asia
Armenia  43.5  0.27  - 0.59
Azerbaijan  23.5  - _
Georgia  18.9  0.29  - 0.43
Kyrgyz Republic  49.1  0.31  0.55  0.47
Kazakhstan  5.7  0.30  0.33  0.35
Tajildstan  68.3  0.28  - 0.47
Turlanenistan  7.0  0.28  0.36  0.45
- not available
a Mostly 1998-99, see source for details.
Source: World Bank 2000b, pp. 35  and 140.
7Related  to  the above  is the subjective  perception  of poverty  in CECA  countries.  The
income  shocks  referred  to  above  were  not  viewed  positively  by  the  population.9 When
Russians  were  asked  in  1993  what  their idea  of a  minimum  poverty  line  would  be,  the
response  generated a number which put 90 percent of the population in poverty-about  3-4
times  the  official  estimates  (Ravallion  and  Loshkin  1999).  As  the  economic  decline
continued,  however,  this  subjective  poverty  line  gradually  fell,  so  that by  1997,  only  60
percent  of the  population  was  in poverty  according  to the people's  views  about a poverty
line. While people's expectations gradually lowered, there was still broad feeling that poverty
was  widespread.  Even  in  countries  where  income  levels  had  recovered  and  most  of the
population  was better off in expenditure  terms than  they had been in  1990,  many reported
being worse off since the transition began.' 0
Wo1  are the poor? The  correlates  of income  poverty  show significant  commonality
across transition economies.  In general,  the aging  are not over-represented  among the poor.
Contrary  to  initial  expectations,  this  group  has  mostly  stayed  above  the poverty  line,  for
several  reasons.  First, high  (often unsustainable)  pension  expenditures  have  supported  this
group.  Second,  retirement  ages are low. As  a result, most continued to work for at least  10
years  after  retirement,  providing  a  second  source  of  income.  Third,  most  were  the
beneficiaries  of housing privatization  or land repatriation.  While it was  difficult to  sell  this
asset and increase  cash income,  housing (and associated  land)  did provide  a way to make a
subsistence,  through  a  kitchen  garden,  for  example.  There  is  a  small  subset  of  older
pensioners  (over  70)  in richer  countries,  often  living  alone,  who have  faced  poverty  and
deprivation.  These  are  usually  women,  owing  to  an  average  10-year  difference  in  life
expectancies.  In poor  countries,  where  pensions  have  been  cut  and  arrears  have  built up,
poverty  aniong pensioners  is increasing.  In these countries  as well, single pensioners  face  a
high risk of poverty (e.g., Georgia, Moldova).
As  in the rest of the world,  a higher  dependency  ratio  is correlated  with poverty as
larger  households,  especially households  with children,  are more  likely to be  in poverty.
This  is  the  case  even  when  household  income  or  expenditure  data  is  corrected  for
economies  of scale,  using  an  equivalence  scale.  While few  households  in the European
countries  have more than two children, those that do, especially if there is only one  earner,
have  a high probability of poverty."  In poorer areas  such  as the  Caucasus,  families have
increasingly  formed  multi-generational  households  as  a  coping  strategy,  but  these
households  still have  a higher  probability of poverty when  children  are present.  The one
exception is single-headed  households  with children where another earner has migrated but
sends  remittances.  Remittances  are  a  significant  factor  in  helping  prevent  poverty  in
Armenia (Murrugarra 2002).12
The main causes of poverty in CECA countries are low earnings among working parents
(including  among the employed  in countries where  wages  are paid infrequently)  or lack of
9 This  is another  remmder  of the  well-known  result that variance  matters to people  as much as  mean. Many
studies have shown that people are risk-averse, and are willing to trade off rate of return for lower risk.
'° See World Bank (2002b) for a discussion of this issue in Bulgaria.
1  For example,  in Latvia,  the  relative  risk of poverty  more  than doubles  if a  household  has  more than  two
children. However,  only two percent of households in Latvia fall into this category (Gassmann 2000).
12  It is unclear whether the uneven flow of remittances  accounts for the high rate of transient poverty but much
lower rate o f chronic poverty in Armenia.
8earners in the  household.1 3 Households  headed by unemployed  or non-working  adults have
the highest  poverty rates.  This indicates  that the unemployment  insurance  and active  labor
market  policies  have  had  limited  effectiveness  compared  to,  for  example,  the  pension
programs.1 4 One reason  is long-term unemployment,  which  is not eased  by unemployment
insurance because benefits are limited in duration.  In Bulgaria, for example, 64 percent of the
unemployed  had  been  out  of work  for  more  than  one  year.  Another  reason  is  lack  of
eligibility. Those who left the state sector to work in the informal sector may not be covered.
More common than unemployment  as a cause of poverty, however,  are low wages  (or
low self-employment  income). In Poland, Lithuania, Moldova,  and Georgia,  over 70 percent
of poor households have an employed head.'5 The problem is the income of these earners.  As
wage differentials widened,  especially between more and less educated workers, households
where the earners  have less human capital find themselves more often in poverty.  In Russia,
34 percent of employees  have monthly earnings below two-thirds  of the median  (compared
with  14 percent on average  in OECD countries) (UNICEF 2001). Many of these low earners
live in poor households.  In Ukraine,  education of household head is the strongest correlate of
poverty  (World  Bank  2001e).  In  Bulgaria,  individuals  over  18  with  less  than  secondary
education have 10 times the poverty rate of their more highly educated colleagues. However,
in countries where real wages fell more and higher levels of wage arrears and labor hoarding
persist,  more  education  does  not  reduce  the risk  of poverty  substantially.  For examnple,  in
both  Armenia  and  Georgia,  the relationship  of education  to poverty  is very  weak  (World
Bank 1999b,  1999c).
In  most  countries,  rural  poverty  rates  are  higher,  reflecting  the  difficulties  in  the
agricultural  sector,  which  is  now  open  to  competition  from  efficient  producers  overseas,
especially in the richer countries  and those near the coast. In Bulgaria,  rural residents make
up one-third of households  but two-thirds  of the poor; in Poland and Latvia,  rural residents
have a 50 percent higher risk of poverty (UNICEF 2001).  In these countries,  the agricultural
sector has a large number of basically subsistence farmers and a minority of more prosperous
commercial  farmers.  If a  rural  household  has  additional  sources  of income  (e.g.,  wages
and/or pensions), it is less likely to be poor than if it has to depend on its own production.  In
the poorer countries, the  economy  is so depressed that both urban  and rural areas  are poor,
and access to land for subsistence farming has actually been part of the safety net. Common
to  rural  areas  in  all  countries  is  less  access  to  government  support  in  the  form  of cash
transfers  (except  pensions)  and  heating  subsides  (which  tend  to  reach  mostly  urban
households),  and  lower-quality  public  services  such  as  education.  This  has  contributed  to
growing rural poverty and increased the severity of rural poverty.
In urban areas, capital cities are booming. Residents there tend to have the best access to
public programs,  including  safety net programs.  Outside of the  capital, many countries  find
pockets  of poverty  in one-company  towns  where  the main  factory  closed.  This  is in  part
caused by sluggish  labor mobility.  Older unemployed  workers,  in particular,  find it difficult
to  move  for  many  reasons,  including  the  cost  of relocation  and  the  disruption  of social
13  World Bank 2000b, pp. 70-71.
14  This is not necessarily  a shortcoming  as the main objective of both pensions and unemployment insurance  is
income smoothing which is related to, but not the same as, poverty reduction..  However,  the weak performance
of unemployment  insurance  in reducing poverty does raise  questions about other designs  which might reduce
some benefits to target more assistance to the long-term unemployed.
15 World Bank 2000b, p. 95.
9networks.  Finally,  ethnic  minorities  are  at high risk of poverty,  as  are areas  populated  by
these  minorities.  In Bulgaria,  the  Roma  are  ten times  more  likely to be poor than  ethnic
Bulgarians, while Turks are four times more likely to be poor (World Bank 2002b).
The problem of equivalence scales, or do we really know how to measure  poverty? Most
of the poverty estimates  presented  in this paper  are headcounts  of people whose household
per capita income  is below a poverty line. In most cases, this is corrected by an equivalence
scale, which reduces  the denominator in the fraction  (household income/number of people in
the household) when the household  has two or more people in it to adjust for economies of
scale  in household  production  (based  on the  old idea that  two  can live more cheaply  than
one).  In uncorrected  data,  the  elderly are consistently  less poor than  families with children
because they tend to live in smaller households.  Once  a correction is made, the share of the
elderly poor tends to rise in all countries (although few households with many children drop
out, indicating that poverty is still more severe in this group). Is this the end of the story?
In  a  recent  paper,  Lanjouw,  Milanovic,  and  Paternostro  (1998)  attempt  to  pull  the
question  of equivalence  scales  apart  a  bit  more.  They  note  that  a  household  typically
consumes  lboth  shared  goods  and  services  (housing,  utilities),  and  individually  consumed
goods  (food,  medical  care).  The  basket  consumed  (and  needed)  by  the  latter  differs
depending  on demographics.  Households  with  children  buy  more education  for  example,
while,  those  with  aging  members  tend  to  buy  more  health  care.  An  equivalence  scale
typically captures (and combines)  two dimensions:  (a) the relative price of shared goods vs.
individual  goods,  and (b)  the relative price of goods and services consumed by children vs.
those consunmed by adults (including the aging). In economies  where these relative prices are
stable,  the use of one factor to adjust for both dimensions may be appropriate.  However,  in
transition economies, both relative prices have been shifting as subsidies are removed and the
economy  opens to  imports.  Most shared goods,  such as housing and utilities,  have  become
more  expensive.  Some  individually  consumed  goods,  such  as  some  foods,  have  become
relatively  cheaper,  while  others  (e.g.,  education  and  especially  health  care)  have  become
more expensive.  As a result, over the transition period, the relative cost of a basic basket of
goods has  changed  several  times.  This implies that there may not be a reliable  equivalence
scale for the period.
Two  implications  follow  from  this  analysis.  First,  poverty  headcounts  (even  when
adjusted by an equivalence  factor)  and in particular intertemporal  comparisons of poverty in
transition  economies  are  subject  to  significant  "noise."  Lanjouw,  et.  al.,  suggest  in  their
conclusion  that the  best way to  look  at household  risk of poverty  is by total  dependency
ratio-the fewer earners (including pension earners) in a household,  the higher the likelihood
of poverty.  This  is  clearly  and  obviously  true,  not  only  in  CECA.  Secondly,  and  more
important  for policy,  these relative price changes  have  subjected households,  even middle-
income ones, to significant and unexpected shocks which have been difficult to manage. This
has  added  to  the  subjective  perception  of poverty  and  to  the  psychological  costs  of the
transition. For the aging on fixed incomes, adjusting to these relative price changes has been
particularly hard. It is no wonder that, while not generally poor, this group is often the most
dissatisfied with its  living conditions  under the transition,  a position which usually garners
wide public sympathy and support.
10Reducing poverty: The Role and Effectiveness of Safety Net Programs
As  noted above,  countries  used  a range  of public interventions  to  fight  poverty.  The  vast
majority of these (classified by expenditure) was untargeted  (Box  1),  implying that most of
the benefits went to the non-poor.
Box 1: Evaluating the Poverty Reduction Effectiveness of Transfer Programs
The effectiveness  of a transfer program  in reducing poverty (the  extent of targeting)  can be characterized  in
several ways:
*  Coverage: the percent of the poor who receive the benefit
*  Leakage: the share of expenditures  which goes to the non-poor
*  Adequacy: the average  share of the benefit  in total household  consumption  or, alternatively,  the
poverty head count (and/or poverty gap) without the benefit.
A benefit can have different rankings on each dimension.  For examnple, untargeted,  income smoothing programs
such  as  public pensions  or unemployment  insurance  tend to have  high  leakage  but also  a high effect  on the
poverty rate. Safety net programs are not designed primarily for income smoothing but instead for reduction of
absolute  deprivation.  Ideally,  these  programs  should  have  high coverage,  low  leakage,  and  high  adequacy.
Universal  or  contribution-based  programs  are  excellent  for  social  risk management,  but  can  be  expensive
poverty  reduction  programs  compared  to  more  targeted  safety  net  programs.  However,  if these  broader
programs are not m place, getting an equivalent poverty reduction with targeted programs would be more costly
and perhaps less politically sustainable  (see Graham 2001  for a discussion).  A key issue is the expenditure  mix,
especially when insurance benefits are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
In  Russia,  recent  analyses  have  found  that  many  safety  net  programs  are  untargeted.  Overall,  a
government study found that only one-third of total safety net expenditures reached the poor-two-thirds leaked
to the non-poor. Fuel and rent subsidies are a good example.  Subsidies  were allocated  disproportionately  to the
two richest cities-Moscow and St. Petersburg, where 36 percent received  a subsidy compared to only 6 percent
in  rural areas.  As a result,  there  was  high leakage.  In 2000,  14 percent  of expenditures  went to  the poorest
quintile  of households,  while  21  percent  went  to the top  quintile.  Richer  households  also  received  a higher
absolute  amount.  Child  allowances  fared  better,  but  still  had  substantial  leakage,  as  23  percent  of total
expenditures  went to the poorest quintile, while  15 percent went to the richest.
Three  basic  patterns  of policy  and programmatic  responses  can  be  observed:  (a)  the
middle-income,  fast-reforming  countries  (mostly the pre-EU accession countries),  with high
spending and the lowest poverty rates in the region;  (b) the slow-reforming,  middle-income
countries,  where poverty rates  are  significantly higher  than in the  first group  despite high
spending;  and (c) the  low-income,  often slow-reforming  countries,  where poverty rates  are
highest and social expenditures are lowest (relatively and absolutely).
Middle-income, faster-reforming  countries (EU-accession countries):  In these countries,
social  spending  was  usually  15-20  percent  of  GDP  (or  more),  with  cash  transfers  to
households  absorbing the largest chunk. As a result, cash transfers were an important source
of income for the vast majority of households.  In Romania  and Bulgaria,  for example, over
80 percent of households received at least one benefit in 2001.  In terms of safety net benefits,
child benefits were the largest expenditure item. A means-tested  social assistance system was
introduced in all countries during the early years of the transition.  Coverage in these systems
was low according  to a  study done in  1999,  although  several  countries  have recently madeimproveraents in their policies  and administration  (see Table 3 and Annex  1). However,  most
countries  still  devote  a  very  small  fraction  of total  social  expenditures  to  means-tested
programs. For example, in 2000, Romania spent 16.7 percent of GDP on social sector current
expenditures,  with nearly  60  percent  going  for  social  insurance  and  categorical  benefits.
Slightly over 1 percent was spent on means-tested social assistance.
Hungary's  expenditure pattem is typical.  In  1997,  65  percent  of households  received
either a pension or a family allowance,  but only 9 percent received  social assistance.  Thirty-
eight million forints were spent on social assistance payments, but 306 billion forints (about
1.1  percent  of GDP) were  spent  on  family benefits (World  Bank 2001a).  This implies that
social assistance programs  constituted less than  1 percent of total social spending, compared
with about 3 percent in Germany  and the United  Kingdom,  4 percent in the United  States,
and 5.6 percent in Sweden. Few countries made use of scholarships or fee waivers, relying on
broad-coverage  health  insurance  programs  and  universal  free  primary  and  secondary
education.  Outside  of  (mostly)  free  social  services,  subsidized  provision  of privately-
consumed goods was limited.
This pattem of spending has  been much debated,  with the progressive but untargeted
nature  of most spending noted. There  is no doubt that the package  of high social insurance
spending combined with child allowances and small social assistance programs prevented the
poverty.  In the Hungarian  case, it is estimated  that poverty would have  been a third higher
without  child  benefits  and  poverty  would  have  doubled  without  the  public  pension
program.16 In Bulgaria,  it is estimated that poverty would have been  almost double in 2001
without  government  cash  transfers.  At the  same  time,  the leakage17 for these programs  is
high, especially  for social insurance  programs,  which by their nature  are not  targeted  and
therefore  are  designed  to  be  "leaky."  But even  in  the  case of child  allowances,  only  20
percent of expenditures  in Hungary went to the bottom quintile,  compared  with  46 percent
for social assistance (World Bank 2000b, 2001a).
In temis of allocation of resources among programs,  overspending on pensions has been
criticized  (Fox  1997; Fox and Palmer 2001;  Heller and Keller 2001;World  Bank  1994  and
2000b) and the role of child allowances  has been debated as spending has fallen in real terms
(UNICEF 2001,  F6rster and Toth 2001).  Implicit  in this criticism  is that, if there had been
less  spending  on  pensions  and  other untargeted  insurance  and  assistance  programs,  more
would have been available for targeted poverty relief. With respect to child allowances, most
analysts  now  conclude  that, at  current  expenditure  levels  (spending  is usually  less than  1
percent  of GDP),  these are  fairly ineffective  anti-poverty  strategies,  but should be kept for
other reasons.  Raising children has high  social externalities  so is worthy of support, and the
alternative of using tax credits would be much more regressive (World Bank 2000a, Andrews
and Ringold  1999, UNICEF 2001).
16  Of course,  this  type of static  analysis  has  serious  limitations  as it  assumes  no behavioral  response  if the
payments dried up. It is more likely that some of the lost income would have been made up by private transfers,
since  it would have been left in employee's  wages, not collected  as taxes. Labor supply among  older workers
would be higher as well.
17 Leakage  is percent of expenditures  that goes to non-poor households.  For example,  although unemployment
is highly conelated with poverty in Bulgaria,  only one-third  of the  amount spent on unemployment  benefits,
including unemployment assistance, went to poor households.
12With respect to pensions,  the jury is still out on the costs and benefits of the high levels
of spending.  There will be high  fiscal costs for a long time, potentially lowering investment
and growth. However, Keane and Prasad (2000) argue that this high level of cash transfers to
households helped to maintain social cohesion-a necessary condition for the reformns, which
brought  growth.  Several  recent  analyses  have  concluded  that  the  system  overall  has
discouraged  labor supply.  This is one reason  that employment  levels have not recovered  -
there  appears  to  have  been  substantial  withdrawal  from  the  labor  force,  which  raised
dependency  ratios and lowered  economic  growth.'8 Unemployment  benefits combined with
social assistance in Slovakia supported  a longer duration of unemployment (Sanchez-Paramo
2002), but also an effective transfer of labor into the private sector. The level of spending on
health and education is generally not criticized. Access to social services in these countries is
generally  good,  and  the  risk  of high  medical  payments  causing  poverty  is  low.  Usually,
studies  find the poor spending less than 10 percent of their income on out-of-pocket costs for
health care or education,  so this aspect of the social protection system worked well.
Middle-income,  slower-reforming countries. These  countries  spend  about  the  same
amount on health and education  as the low spenders  in the above group (about  10 percent of
GDP). The main difference  is that these countries  spend more on subsidies to households for
private  goods-housing,  utilities,  fuel,  telecommunications,  transport,  credit,  cars,
prescription  drugs,  health  resorts,  etc.  They  also  tend  to  have  a broad  range  of benefits
provided to  categorical  groups-war  veterans  and their  families,  occupational  groups,  etc.
Often there are more than  100 benefits, in a system which had its origins in Soviet times and
has expanded dramatically since (World Bank 2001d). These tend to cost 3-5 percent of GDP
and are not targeted. One large expenditure item has been spending on war veterans and other
victims of catastrophe  (e.g.,  Chemobyl), which is exceedingly popular but rarely progressive.
This  has  been  a particular  problem  in Bosnia  and Ukraine.  Benefits  from  these  complex
systems tend to  accrue disproportionately  to those in the urban, state-owned  sector,  leaving
the  rural  poor  behind.  For  example,  housing  and  utility  subsidies  benefit  upper-income
dwellers  more,  since  they  have  larger dwellings,  and tend  to benefit  urban  residents.  The
rural poor, relying on wood, coal, and other unsubsidized heating fuels, do not benefit.
The  slow-growing,  middle-income  countries  spend  significantly  less  on  child
allowances, and little if anything on means-tested programs-in Ukraine,  0.4 percent of GDP
was spent on family allowances and 0.5 percent on means-tested  social assistance in 1999.  In
the same year, a little over 4 percent of GDP was spent on health and 10 percent on pensions
(World Bank 2001d )*19
Safety net expenditures tend to be less targeted than in the fast-reforming countries. This
is not surprising,  given the complexity of the benefit systems, which are a combination of old
Soviet  merit-based  ones  and  new  programs  initiated  during  the  transition  (e.g.,  energy
subsidies).  As  many  of  the  benefits  are  nationally  mandated  but  locally  financed  and
administered,  they are not usually progressive,  since poor areas are not able to finance them
and tend to run arrears. For example, in Kazakhstan  in 1996, only 6 percent of general social
18  In a general equilibrium system, increasing  factors of production increases  economic growth and vice versa. .
It is arguable that, in the early years of the transition, aggregate  demand deficiency was so great that increasing
labor supply would not increase  growth, but over the medium termn,  surely the growth costs are being  felt. See
World Bank (1994)  for a discussion of this point.
9 As a benchmnark, this compares with Gernany and the United Kingdorn,  which spent 7 percent of total public
social welfare and health expenditures on child allowances.
13assistance  expenditures  went to  the  poorest 20 percent  of households.  On the other  hand,
these  counitries  are  more likely to means-test  child  allowances,  improving  the targeting.  In
Kazakhstan,  24 percent of the means-tested child allowance expenditures went to the poorest
quintile.  There  is  some  evidence  that  household  financing  of social  services  tends  to  be
higher in these countries,  as there is a higher incidence of infornal payments and user fees-
roughly correlated  with levels of corruption.20 Public safety net programs do not seem to be
addressing this issue.
Spending patterns  in  these countries  can be  faulted  both for the poor targeting of the
safety net benefits  as well  as for the  overall  social protection  expenditure  mix-too much
spending  on insurance programs,  which  do not benefit the poor and  encourage  withdrawal
from the  labor  force.  Both issues  bite harder  in these  countries  because  poverty  rates  are
higher  in this  group  of countries,  and therefore  needs are  higher.  Spending  on  insurance-
based  cash  transfers  and  formal  employment-linked  safety  net benefits  may  have  a more
regressive  impact  in  these  countries  owing  to  the  size  of the  informal  sector  (where,  for
example,  subsidies  linked  to  employment  would  not  be  available).  For  example,  pension
coverage is declining rapidly as the informal sector grows, but retirement ages are still quite
low, so dependency burdens are rising. The complexity of the system has also been cited as a
source of corruption, as rationing systems are not clear.
Targeting  is  considered  administratively  feasible  in  these  countries  (e.g.,  Russia,
Kazakhstan,  Ukraine), but it seems politically unpopular.  The exception is child allowances,
where  this  group  of countries  stands  out  as  more likely to  impose  means  tests  (Belarus,
Ukraine,  LUzbekistan).  Another  exception to  this weak  performance  in targeting  safety  net
programs  is  the  Mahalla  program  in  Uzbekistan,  a  flexible  benefit  allocated  by  local
community  groups.  It  is  progressive  and has  low  overhead  costs  (Coudouel,  Marnie,  and
Micklewright  1999).  It has  a leakage  factor of about 40 percent - not  a bad ratio  in  CECA
countries.  Mahalla committees  also  administer  the means  testing of child  allowances,  with
similar results.  In 2000,  26 percent of households  in  the poorest quintile received benefits,
compared with  only 6 percent of the richest quintile;  54 percent of expenditures went to the
bottom  40  percent.  Overall,  child  allowances  are  estimated  to  reduce  the  headcount  of
poverty  by  two  percentage  points.  However,  a  recent  analysis  cites  complex  application
procedures as a barrier for some poor applicants,  and notes the need for monitoring to insure
that  political  judgements  do  not  cloud  the  decentralized  award  decisions  (World  Bank
2002h).
Low-income countries. Safety nets in low-income countries  are generally poor.  This  is
primarily because the needs are greater and the means less. The collapse in fiscal systems has
meant that  financing  for education  and health  have  fallen sharply-in  most countries  to  3
percent of GDP or below for each. Private financing  (out-of-pocket costs paid by households)
has  increased,  and  as  a result,  access  is  a problem.  In  Tajilistan,  37 percent  of pregnant
women  diid  not  seek pre-natal  care  due  to  its  cost,  and  in  the Kyrgyz  Republic,  over  45
percent of rural households  reported  selling  assets to  finance  health  care  (Lewis  2000).  In
20 This patterm  is not clear cut.  In Bulgaria,  only 21 percent of patients reported making mformal payments,  but
in Poland,  78 percent reported maling these payments-higher than in Russia. The difference seems to be in the
magnitude as  a share of income.  In Russia,  74 percent reported making these payments,  comnprising  on average
3.5 percent  of total household  spending (Lewis  2000). In Romania,  54 percent of households reported making
payments,  but the average payment was  only 0.6 percent of total household spending per capita  (World Bank
2001a).
14these countries,  a minimum element  of the safety net-protection  from the risk of poverty
due to health care expenditures-is not present.
Many of these countries  also have the range of social assistance benefits  and privileges
of their  higher-income  neighbors  from  the  former  Soviet  Union  (FSU).  For  example,
Moldova  has  over  100  different  benefits,  costing  over  3  percent  of GDP  (World  Bank
1999c).  Armenia  had  a  similar pattern  before  the  1999  reform  (see below).  But  in  these
countries,  few of the legal obligations  are honored,  given low  funding.  In Moldova,  only 56
percent of the estimated cost of the benefits was included in the budget in 2000.21 As a result,
a rationing process occurs, which is usually non-transparent  and favors  urban areas. Arrears
in benefits  are also common.  In Georgia in 1997, only half of the planned allocation on child
allowances  was actually spent. When they are paid, social insurance payments are also lower
in these countries.  In Armenia,  unemployment benefits were reported to be so low that few of
those eligible  claimed them (de Neubourg and Morris  1999).  Similar problems  are reported
elsewhere-high  administration  time  for  very  small  benefits.  Utility  subsidies,  when
provided,  tend to be regressive,  as they are concentrated  on urban households  in the capital
cities (in the form of tariff reductions or arrears forgiveness).
Armenia  and Kosovo  have  both  been  recognized  as  countries  which  put  in place  a
successful  targeting  system to  allocate  emergency  safety  net  foreign  aid.  Both countries
relied mostly on categorical  variables to  estimate need, because  calculating  and estimating
incomes  would have been very time consuming,  with a high degree of error. The Armenian
system  had  a  fairly  complex  formula  with  a  large  number  of variables.  In  simulations,
simpler formulas performed equally well, however. Errors of exclusion were not very high in
either  system  compared  with  the  richer  countries,  and  seemed  to  primarily  stem  from
complex  registration  and  difficulties  in  evaluating  assets.  In  Armenia,  non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) are also an important source of targeted aid (World Bank 1999b).
Selling assets, labor migration, and relying on informal safety net transfers  from family
clan and community members are the dominant coping mechanisms  for the poor.  In Albania,
these informal mechanisms  and community structures are used to effectively target safety net
funds.  Community  targeting  seems  to have  worked well  to  insure  that over  60 percent  of
expenditures  from  the  Ndihme  benefit  program  in  Albania,  which  is  allocated  by  local
groups, goes to the poorest households.
Use of  social care to help  families in crisis. A key feature, and a tragic legacy, of most
CECA economies prior to the transition was the use of residential institutions  for social care.
Frail  elderly and  disabled  adults  and  children,  children  who lost  one or both parents,  and
children born into difficult circumstances  (to poor teen or single mothers, for example) were,
often at  the urging of the social  services  network,  placed into residential  care,  where  they
were  excluded  and  marginalized,  and  they  died.  A  1999  estimate  found  over  1.3  million
people, the majority of them children,  in these care institutions. The number of people in care
has  nearly doubled  over  the  transition period,  while  conditions  deteriorated  (table  2).  The
increase  in  people  in  care  is  another  reflection  of the  stress  the  transition  placed  upon
families.
21  Moldova is in the process of reformiing these benefits.
15Table 2: The Number and Rate of Children in Out-of-Home Care, by Main Sub-Region,  1989
and 1999
Absolute  number (1,000s)  Rate (per  100,000 0-1 7year-oids)
1989  1999  Difference  1989  1999  Difference
Central Europe  276.6  290.3  13.7  1,507  1,916  409
Former Yugoslavia  41.1  28.2  -12.9  635  504  -131
Southeastern  Europe  154.2  134.8  -19.3  1,529  1,680  151
Baltic states  15.7  32.8  17.2  748  1,860  1,112
Western  CIS  829.0  908.0  -10.7  1,436  1,871  435
Caucasus  54.1  43.4  -10.7  971  796  -175
Central Asia  87.6  114.9  27.3  402  495  93
Total  1,458.2  1,552.5  94.3  1,194  1 ,441  247
Source. UNICEF (2001), p.  97.
It appears that the use of these institutions has been a key part of the safety net. Children
from poor fiamilies and from ethnic minorities  are much more likely to end up in care as the
free room and board operates  as an income substitute.  Yet not only is this type of custodial
care very damaging for children, it is also  much more costly than supporting the children at
home. Couatries are beginning to tackle this problem through reform strategies, designed to
both  change  the  approach  of key  points  of contact  for  troubled  families  toward  a  more
inclusive one, and to support the development of new, community-based services,  which are
usually cheaper,  better, and reach a broader share of the population.22
Analysis of Safety Net Experiences
Throughout most of the first decade of the transition, safety net programs,  especially means-
tested cash social  assistance, played  a very small  role in poverty reduction,  except in a few
countries.  This result is not surprising,  as means-tested programs were usually poorly funded
and often  poorly  administered,  resulting  in poor  targeting.  For example,  in Bulgaria  and
Estonia  at  the middle of the decade,  only 3 percent  of households  received  anything  at all
from the social  assistance  system.  Even  so, in Estonia, over 50 percent of those households
were not classified as poor by the national poverty line. In Lithuania in 2000, only 13 percent
of poor households  received  the benefit  and,  as a result, the income-tested  social assistance
programs reduced poverty by roughly one percentage point (a 15 percent reduction).
Categorical  benefits, such  as child  allowances  and subsidies  on public services  for the
aging  or  for  public  workers  and their dependents,  have  also  consumed  a higher  share  of
resources  than means-tested  programs,  although  the share of these programs  in total social
expenditures  has  been  falling  with  the  fiscal  crisis.  Most  analyses  find  that  the  energy
subsidies  were not targeted (World Bank 2000a).  Child allowances present  a mixed picture.
In countries such as Uzbekistan,  where categorical child allowance benefits are means-tested,
effectiveness  has been higher.  In  countries with well-administered  universal  child benefits
2 For a discussion of the problem and reform solutions, see Tobis (2000) and UNICEF (2001). For a discussion
of financing issues, see Fox and Gotestam (2002).
16(such as Hungary),  these benefits, while not targeted,  are at least progressive,  with  a modest
poverty reduction  impact.  In  Lithuania,  the universal  child benefit for children up to age 3
only  reduced  poverty by 8 percent.  In  countries  where  benefits  are  not  universal  but  not
means-tested  (such as Bulgaria)  or where administration is poor and funds do not reach the
poorest areas (such as Russia and Moldova), the expenditure seems to be regressive.
Several  middle-income  countries  have  made improvements  in their means-tested  cash
benefit systems since the data in Table 3 were collected,  suggesting that the effectiveness  of
safety net programs in poverty reduction is growing.  In Estonia by 2000,  12.3 percent of poor
households  received  the  means-tested  benefit.  Poor households  were  now  receiving  37.7
percent of total means-tested social assistance expenditures.23 In Romania, significant efforts
have been made to insure  adequate funding.  These efforts paid off and, by 1999, the poorest
20  percent  received  over  three-quarters  of the  expenditures  on  the  means-tested  social
assistance benefit,  and the poverty rate was reduced by 37 percent  (World Bank 2002f).  In
Bulgaria  in  1997,  only  18 percent  of the  benefits  of the cash and in-kind social  assistance
programs went to the poorest quintile,  but by  2001,  68 percent of expenditures  went to the
poorest quintile (World Bank 2002g).
Table 3: Coverage,  Targeting Efficiency,  and Effectiveness  of Benefits in Selected  CECA
Countries, 1993-95
Russian
Indicator  Poland  Hungary  Bulgaria  Federaton  Estonia
Percentage  of Households below  38  8  2  36  3
national poverty line
Coverage of Social Assistance
benefits
Percentage of households  4  24  3  13  3
Percentage of poor  6  43  10  13  10
Inclusion errorsa  36  86  92  84  65
Exclusion errorsb  94  57  90  87  90
Targeting efficiencyc  21  27  22  8  35
Effectivenessd  22  5  4  4  15
Note: Poverty line is the national poverty line for each country.
a. Share of  the non-poor who receive social assistance.
b. Share of the poor who do not receive social assistance.
c. Share of total transfer expenditures to bottom decile.
d. Social assistance as a share of expenditures of recipients.
Source: Braithwaite,  Grootaert,  and Milanovic (2000).
Why  were means-tested programs initially such a small part of the expenditure mix?
Although  most  advisors  recommended  putting  in  place  means-tested  social  assistance
programs at the beginning of the transition (see for example,  Barr (1994)), these systems did
not live  up to  expectations,  either in coverage  or  in targeting  efficiency.  Part of the reason
that means-tested  social  assistance  systems played  such a small role is that countries  tended
23 Personal communication,  Arvo Kuddo, based on Estonian sources.
17to  rely  on  the  institutions  they  already  had--especially  social  insurance,  but  also
"privileges'-with differing results.
In the richer, faster-reforming  countries, this strategy worked best. These countries were
able to combine existing social sector institutions  and structures such  as the social  insurance
and public social  service financing and delivery system with market-based systems such as  a
competitive  labor market and housing privatization to prevent  and alleviate poverty.  In part
because of Ihe effectiveness  of the reform program,  the proliferation of "privileges" for urban
public  sector workers did not appear as it did in middle-income  FSU countries.  In the fast-
reforming countries,  social assistance was used sparingly,  to pick up the small slack, and the
slack was smaller given the  strong coverage  of the non-targeted  programs.24 This  approach
was costly, but it was made possible in part by better economic performance  that is attributed
to  a  more  successful  reform  program.  However,  the  long-term  costs  (especially  of the
pension programs)  are worrisome.  Many of these countries  are now improving  their means-
tested programs  as part of a continuing effort to  control cash transfer  costs while reducing
poverty.  For example,  after  successful  reform  of the  social  insurance  system,  Latvia  has
recently enacted legislation  to strengthen the largely ineffective,  locally-administered  safety
net programs into a national Guaranteed Minimum Income program, which is expected to fill
in the gaps left by the tightening of eligibility requirements  for social insurance as well as the
reduction in benefits.
In the middle-income,  slower-reforming  countries,  the strategy did not work so well, for
two  reasons.  First,  the  problem  was  more  economically  difficult.  The  fiscal  crunch  was
worse, so there was less money for the programs,  yet more poverty.  Second, slow reformers
tended to have  a higher  subjective  perception  of poverty because  growth was  slower.  As  a
result, the safety net programs  often degenerated into attempts  by interest  groups to recoup
some of their losses (the hundreds of privileges).  Pro-poor public programs were more likely
to  be neglected in  favor of complex,  basically unaffordable  cash transfer systems that were
therefore  governed  by non-transparent  rationing.  The result  was  less  efficiency  in a more
difficult  situation.  This is disappointing  in these  countries,  as the means  to reduce  poverty
seems to be present, as well as the administrative capacity to implement programs.
The  low-income  countries  seemed  to be  overwhelmed  by  the  extent  of the income
decline. The existing programs and institutions which delivered results in the middle-income
countries,  especially the faster reformers,  fell apart  in low-income countries.  Benefits were
not  paid,  or  not  paid  on  time.  The  required  readjustment  of resources  to  improve  the
efficiency of spending and put resources into means-tested programs seemed to be too much.
Most  of these  countries  never  even  developed  a strategy.  Two  low-income  countries  that
appear  to  have  developed  successful  means-tested  programs  (Armenia,  Kosovo)  were  in
effect forced to develop these by donors, as a condition of access to funds.
The complexity of the targeting problem  is an additional  factor that contributed  to the
small  role and  low effectiveness  of means-tested  social assistance  (Grosh  1994).  Targeting
24 Note that even in OECD and middle-income  countries with  good-practice  safety net systems,  expenditures
and coverage of these systems  is well below public expenditures  on social insurance.  This is normal,  as social
insurance  programs  have  a  much  broader  coverage.  However,  even  in  the  best-performing  countries,  the
expenditure rnix in CECA is highly skewed toward non-means-tested programs.  Means-tested programs absorb
a much smaller share of resources than in OECD or good-practice  middle-income  countries.  See,  for example,
OECD (1998).
18problems require measurement of household resources and needs, as well as finding agents to
disburse the assistance.  This was even  more difficult in the transition economies  during the
first decade for the following reasons.
*  Newness of the concept. Targeting according to income was  a new idea that, based
on  the  evidence  above,  has  not  really  taken  hold.  Old  ideas  regarding  giving
benefits  to categories  of people  seemed to  fit the political mood better.  The social
assistance  systems that emerged  seemed to be a mix of Soviet-style privileges  and
Western  targeting.  From  this point of view,  the  political  economy  of poverty  in
some CECA countries  seems  closer to the North American idea of the "deserving
poor"  than  to  the  European  one  of ensuring  that  no  one  goes  without  (Graham
2002). With respect to attitudes  toward spending on safety nets for minority ethnic
groups, there is  strong similarity between American  and Eastern  European views.
This  seems  to be  especially  the  case  in more  decentralized  systems,  where  local
autonomy does not protect minorities.
*  High subjective perception of poverty. Overall  GDP  fell  so  much that  everybody
felt poor.  A strategy  to compensate  the losers for the costs  of reform would have
had to reach almost everyone in the early years. In addition, household income was
volatile. As relative prices changed,  needs changed,  changing the profile of poverty.
Poverty was also shallow, making it hard to separate the poor from the non-poor.  In
this  case,  rationing  of public  resources  to  fight  poverty  through  targeting  was
difficult-there  was probably not broad agreement on the objectives.
*  High  transient poverty.  Related  to  the  above  point,  many  middle-income
households that would not be in poverty in other middle- or lower-income  countries
after  a  macro  or  stochastic  income  shock  ended  up  in  transient  poverty  several
times  in  CECA  countries  primarily  because  their  savings  were  wiped  out  by
inflation.  They had  no private  risk-coping  mechanisms.  The  most  effective  anti-
poverty  mechanism  for  these  people  would  be  stable  economic  growth  and
improvements in the safety and stability of the financial system.
*  Informalization. At the same time,  a new feature emerged - the informal economy.
This  made  it much  harder  to  assess  household  means,  as  many  in the  informal
economy are not poor. Measures to address this problem that have been successful
in  Latin  American  countries  (e.g.,  proxy means  tests)  were  not  as  successful  in
CECA countries.  The main reason was that the proxy variables such as education of
earners  or  housing  conditions  which  separate  the  poor  and  the  non-poor  in
households  in  Latin  America  (where  the  income  of  poor  households  comes
primarily from informal sector employment)  do not separate  households  very well
in CECA countries.
*  Social assistance  delivery systems were weak. All transition countries  suffered from
a  gap  between  what  was  in  the  law  or  decree  passed  in  the  capital  and  what
happened  on  the  ground.  The  administrative  requirements  of targeting  can  be
complex,  and this was not often understood  in legislative  and executive branches,
so  the  laws were  often  difficult  to  follow  in practice  (de  Neubourg  and  Morris
1999).  In most cases,  new  local offices  had to be set up to handle this job.  There
were  few  trained  social  workers  able  to  perform  the  required  quality  control
functions.25 Hence,  studies  found high errors  of both inclusion  and exclusion.  On
25  In  Latvia,  decisions  on  who  got  non-categorical  social  assistance  benefits  were  left  completely  to local
discretion.  . In smaller towns and more  remote areas, the mayor  often decided  who got benefits (and whether
19the other hand,  the delivery  systems  for social  insurance  and  categorical  benefits
were already in place.  The same is true of family services; institutions for children
at risk  and  other vulnerable  groups  were  already  in place,  while  there  were  few
models of community-based,  inclusive  services.  Note  that when countries  tried  to
use  the social  insurance  apparatus  for delivering  safety net benefits,  the informal
and rural sectors were often excluded (e.g.,  Bulgaria).
A  final  factor  was  the  extensive  fiscal  decentralization  which most  CECA  countries
enacted, usually while overall tax revenues were falling.  Social assistance  was often included
in the expenditure  assignments.  Cash-strapped local governments  tended to spend funds first
to  maintain.  the  infrastructure  they  owned  and  to  pay  salaries.  Poverty  reduction  through
means-tested  social  assistance  was  a lower priority.  Braithwaite,  Grootaert,  and Milanovic
(2000) found better targeting  of means-tested  social  assistance in countries that had national
financing of social  assistance,  as has been confirmed  in a number of World Bank country-
level  studies  (e.g.,  Bulgaria,  Latvia,  Romania,  Russia).  Safety  nets  need  at  least  some
national  financing  and  monitoring  to  ensure  effectiveness.  Note  that  the  combination  of
national financing and local administration  seems to work in Uzbekistan.
Looking Ahead: Lessons for the Future for Transitional and Other
Countries
The first lesson from this experience  comes  from the richer,  fast-reforming countries,  and is
an  obvious  one.  Sustained  economic  growth  reduces  poverty.  This  is  especially  true  in
transition economies,  where most of the poor are not marginalized  or excluded, most earners
in the household have skills and are capable  of work, and poverty is often transient.  Indeed,
growth has lifted these richer countries out of the "transition"  category,  as they will soon be
EU members.  This makes  a strong  argument for redirecting  public resources in the slower-
growing,  middle-income  countries  to  investments  that  support  growth  and  away  from
expensive  and  complex  "compensation"  or "privilege"  systems.  Unfortunately,  this case  is
currently  not persuasive  in many countries-especially  for those  who benefit-leading  to
political gridlock over this issue.
In termns  of the policy and program mix, Table 4 reviews the standard list of safety net
programs  used  most  frequently  in  middle-  and  low-income  developing  countries,  and
comments on the application in transition economies.  Several recommendations  stand out.
Table 4: Typical Safety Net Programs, Experience in CECA and Options for the Future
Type  of  Safety Net  Transition Economy
Intervention  Experience  Comments and Recommendations
Family benefits and  Widely used, sometimes  Continue use; insure access outside urban and
non-contnbut-ory  means tested. Progressive  formal sector. Try to exclude upper-income groups
pensions  although without means  through income ceiling.
testing not well targeted.
Means-tested  cash  Most countries have some  High priority for middle-income (non-IDA)
they  were  in  kind  or  in cash)-a  nice  source  of petty  corruption  and  vote  buying.  Social  insurance  and
categorical transfer delivery systems were centralized,  and subject to much greater supervision and control.
20assistance  program; expenditures  low  countries as key poverty reduction measure.
and targeting often weak.  Countries should Improve practice and insure
adequate funding.
Poor countries  can experiment  with simple models
to reduce severity of poverty, combined with other
programs. Administrative requirements should be
kept low.
Energy subsidies  Use declining but still popular;  Phase out in favor of means-tested assistance.
programs primarily benefit
urban middle  class.
Food subsidies  Used initially during  Not recommended because difficult to target.
liberalization
Food rations or food  Not used, except in conflict  Might be useful in low-income countries in urban
stamps  situations.  poverty situations, especially where alcoholism is
present. Education system could be used as delivery
mechanism.
Housing subsidies  Not widely used as most  In current use, not well targeted and should be
housing is owner-occupied.  discontinued except possibly for special cases (e.g.,
Used for municipally-owned  poor single pensioners over 70). May become
housing in areas where  important in the future as part of a package to
privatization  has not taken  encourage labor mobility.
place.
School feeding  Not widely used.  Recommend trials to support community-based
programs  interventions  for children and to improve
attendance  of excluded groups.
School fee waivers  or  Not widely used, in part  Recommend trials to support community-based
free textbooks,  because explicit fees are rare  interventions  for children and to improve
materials  and out-of-pocket costs for  attendance  of excluded groups.
parents are generally low (but
significant for the poor).
Health fee waivers  Often provided for pensioners  Means-tested waivers could be tested in middle-
and children, but under-the-  income countries, for a selected package of
table payments not covered.  services.
Poor countries should reduce costs of a key health
package.
Labor-intensive  public  Not used, in part because  of  Recommend trials as part of regional development
works programs for  association with planned  programs for depressed areas.
unemployed including  economy and/or forced labor
food for work  camps.
Institutional care  Improperly used in cases of  Develop alternatives to support families in the
family poverty (especially  community and discontinue use.
single parent) or a vulnerable
individual needing special
care.
*  Means testing: Recent  improvements  in the  design  and  administration  of means-
tested cash transfers to households in a number of the richer countries  suggest that
increased use  of this strategy  is a  feasible  option,  at least  for the middle-income
countries.  An upward  ceiling on the income of households  eligible  for categorical
benefits  such as child allowances  should also be considered in countries where this
21is  not  in  place.26 It  should  be  noted  that,  even  with  improvements,  significant
leakage  should be  expected,  given  the  relatively  flat  income  distribution  and the
problems of transient poverty, which is exacerbated by low savings.
*  Energy subsidies  and other in-kind subsidies should be phased out,  as these are not
well targeted.
*  Wider  use  of targeted subsidies for social services and school  feeding programs
may  be  justified,  especially  in  low-income  countries,  where  fees  (formal  and
inLformal) are blocking access and exacerbating poverty.
*  All  countries  should  develop  a  reform  program  to  reduce  reliance  on  wasteful
institutional  care.
In general,  countries  should consider trying to move resources out of social  insurance
programs  by  tightening  eligibility,  and  moving  the  funds  into  two  areas-means-tested
programs  and  overall  social  service  delivery.  Social  insurance  programs  as  currently
structured  have  reduced  labor  supply  of the  working-age  population  at  a high  cost  (e.g.,
pension systems). Especially in low-income countries, more funding for other social services
could improve  access for the poor and reduce vulnerability. For example,  expenditures could
be shifted inito programs to reduce the risk of poverty posed by high health expenditures or
improve  access  to  education.  This  is  not  the  most  targeted  resource  re-allocation  (most
incidence  studies would  find the benefits  accrue  to middle-income  groups),  but since these
social  services  are  used  more  intensively  by  dependents  (the  old  and  the  young),  this
approach would favor households with more dependents,  who do tend to be poor. Some pro-
poor elemernts  should be included (sliding fee scales, etc.). Of course,  parallel efforts need to
be  made  to  improve  the  quality  and  cost-efficiency  of these  primarily  publicly-provided
services (including increased use of non-governmental contractors).
Adequate  financing  for safety net programs  is key. Purely local financing of safety net
programs  seems  to ensure poor targeting,  as  the poorest  areas  do not have adequate  funds.
Better results  seem  to be registered when national  financing  (ring-fenced  or earmarked)  is
combined with local community administration. However,  this result is not strongly robust.27
It clearly depends  on the accountability  structures  of local  administrators  and their marginal
propensity  to  spend  on the  poor.  Neglect  and exclusion  of ethnic  minorities  is a common
problem, which can only be countered by national monitoring. Given the transient nature of
poverty,  flexibility  in  program  design  and  regular  re-certification  of  eligibility  is  also
important.  Countries  with  extreme  fiscal  decentralization  could  consider  a partial  national
financing (nmatching  requirements), but this approach will continue to favor richer areas.
Regional  pockets of poverty may benefit from  increased use of employment  generation
programs  such as labor-intensive  public works, especially if used in combination with back-
to-work incentives in other safety net and insurance programs.
26  Note that  child  allowances  also have  an income  smoothing  function  between child-rearing  and non-child-
rearing years,  and are partial compensation for the social costs of child rearing.  Therefore,  the case for limiting
this benefit to the very poorest households is weaker, but the case for imposing an upper ceiling on the income
of recipients of perhaps half the median per capita household income is stronger.  See Holzmann and Jorgensen
(1999).
27 See Klugman (1997) for framework and evaluation of decentralization of programs for children.
22In the lowest-income  countries, national means-tested cash benefit programs may not be
feasible owing to cost and weak administrative  capacity.  However,  countries can take steps
to  simplify  cash  benefit  systems  and  improve  the  targeting  of existing  child  allowance
programs,  for  example.  National  resources  provided  for  local  programs  that  support
economic growth  (e.g.,  social find-type  programs)  or provide community-based  services to
residents  may increase  the effectiveness  of the safety net.  In these  countries,  scarce public
resources  need  to  be  spent  on  investment,  including  insuring  access  to  education  and
effective health care.28
Donors should continue to support the institutional development of the social assistance
service  system.  This  includes  training  in  social  work  and  in program  evaluation.  It  also
includes  attention  to  the  sociological  and psychological  costs  of the transition  (including
breakdown of social capital) and the effects on families, especially children at risk.
Monitoring program outcomes  and evaluating impact is always important,  but it is even
more  important  when  developing  new  approaches  in  transition  economies.  The  recent
improvements  cited  above  came  in part  as  a result of previous  analyses  showing  program
ineffectiveness.  Transition  economies  should  include  monitoring  plans,  using  household
survey data, in their poverty alleviation strategies.
As  we  argued  above,  the  transition  was  quite  sui generis. However,  one  important
lesson  does  emerge  which  may be  of help  for  other  countries  as  well  as  the  remaining
transition  economies.  When  reacting  to  a  social  and  economic  shock  as  strong  as  the
transition, it may be less risky to try to develop strategies  based on existing institutions  and
laws,  even if these  are  second or third best.  It takes time to  develop  new,  effective  social
institutions-both  in  terms  of developing  an  administrative  culture  that  supports  such  an
institution and in terms of public support. Institutions imported from other cultures need to be
adapted in  any case.  In order  for this  adaptation  to be  effective,  the  objectives  have  to be
clear and well supported.
28 See Smith and Subbarao  (2001) for a discussion of  safety nets in situations of mass poverty.
23Annex 1: Summary of Recent Country-Level Analyses on Poverty and the
Effectiveness of Safety Nets
Note: This table is drawn from individual  World Bank country analyses,  various years.  The
poverty  lines  are  not  comparable  across  countries,  nor  are  the  evaluations.  The  data  are
presented  purely  to  give  a  quick  snapshot  collage  of the region,  and  an  indication  of the
richness of country-level  analysis.
Country  Findings  on poverty (latest estimate)  Evaluation of  Safety Nets
Albania  Poor 30 percent rural,  15 percent urban,  Social assistance  spending  1.6 percent of
have more children, are self-employed  (not  GDP; use of means testing plus conmmunity
wage eamers), are older, have less  targeting resulted in over 50 percent of
education.  lowest-income  decile getting benefits;
percentage getting benefits falls as income
increases.
Allegations of corruption at local level.
Armenia  Poor:  55 percent  Social assistance (Paros system): 54 percent
Extreme poverty: 28 percent  goes to the poorest 40 percent
Urban population poorer, but higher
extreme poverty in rural areas; working
households with children poor; high income
mequality.
Azerbaijan  45 percent of  payments untargeted
Bulgaria  Poor:  12.8 percent  31 percent of households receiving means-
Poverty gap: 4.2 percent  tested social assistance are poor, but these
households received 53 percent of total
Roma: 62 percent poor  expenditures.
Estonia  Poor:  15.5 percent  12.3 percent of poor households get targeted
social assistance
Georgia  11.1 percent poor; 12.9 percent urban, 9.9
percent rural
Hungary  Poor: 21 percent  24 percent of households receive some
Rural poverty 24 percent  social assistance. 43 percent of poor receive,
23 percent of non-poor receive. Leakage:  87
Poverty gap:  14 percent (Braithwaite,  percent.
Grootaert, and Milanovic  2000)
Long-term poverty 7.5 percent; correlates  of
long-term poverty: rural, unemployment,
children,  single parent,  single female
pensioner, low education, Roma ethnicity
(World Bank 2001b).
Kazakhstan  Poor: 35 percent, have more children,  are  Social assistance spending fell  from 1.4
unemployed;  high regional concentration of  percent of GDP in  1992 to 0.3 percent in
poverty in the south  1997; only 36 percent of poor households
get social assistance; compared with 25
percent of non-poor.
Other benefits and privileges reach primarily
_______  non-poor.
Kosovo  Poor: 50 percent  Food aid: 20 percent of consumption of
Poverty gap:  15.7 percent  poorest quintile, 2 percent for richest
Extreme poverty:  12 percent
24Kyrgyz Republic  Head count of poor: 64 percent  Social assistance: 4 percent of income of
Poverty gap: 25 percent  poorest decile, 2.7 percent of income of
richest decile; importance declined since
Urban poverty: 49 percent  1993.
Only a small percent of households receive
assistance; utility subsidies mostly benefit
non-poor.
Latvia  Poor:  18 percent  15 percent of social assistance received by
Rural poor: 27 percent  lowest decile; leakage = 75 percent
Poverty gap: 4.9 percent
Moldova  Poor: 23.3 percent  Complex set of benefits poorly targeted
Rural poor: 27 percent
2+  children more likely to be poor
Poland  Poor 23 percent  3.7 percent receive social assistance;  64
Rural poor:  34 percent  percent of those receiving social assistance
were poor; 35 percent were non-poor. Social
Poor are nrual,  have large numbers of  assistance was 22 percent of expenditures of
dependents,  and younger, but if older  the poor, 17 percent of  non-poor
families fall into poverty, they do not come  (Braithwaite,  Grootaert,  and Milanovic
out very easily.  2000).
Social assistance was 25 percent of income
of chronically poor,  5 percent of non-poor
(Okrasa  1999)
Russian Federation  Poor: 43.1 percent  13 percent received social assistance; 63
Extremely poor:  15 percent  percent of non-poor get social assistance.
Extremely poor relative risk: rural  1.2 small
and medium urban:  1, major city: 0.5.
Ukraine  Poor: 27 percent  Spending on social assistance: 3 percent of
Extreme poor:  13.5 percent  GDP; 42 percent of families get some
Poor tend to be less educated,  transfers, upper income get more.
Over half of families with young children
did not receive family allowances.
Transfers reduced poverty by 3.5 percent.
Uzbekistan  Mahalla community targeted scheme
reaches 27 percent of  poor households, but
40 percent of benefits go to top 60 percent.
Size of benefit poorly related to need.
Source: See References.  Where there are several sources, the reference  is in the table.
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This paper focuses on  the experience of the transition countries of Central  and Eastern  Europe
and Central  Asia in providing adequate safety nets for the poor during the last  10  years. The
pape-  discusses the problem  of poverty and vulnerability - who  were the poor,  and  how
did the 2  nswer to this question  change over the decade,  it looks at the typical types of
interven1ions offered by governments,  and how this package changed over the period.  It
surveys the evidence on effectiveness  of these programs  in reaching the poor,  in reducing
their income poverty, or reducing other aspects of poverty (e.g.  social exclusion). The results
are qjite striking, as  in  all countries, classic targeted  safety net policies played a small  role
in reducing poverty.  In part, this was because of the uniqueness of the period - conventional
good practice was not always applicable.
Receitly; several  countries in the region  have improved  the coverage and targeting of their
programs, offer good models for other countries.  If all middle income countries in the region
adopted these  models, including insuring adequate financing,  effective poverty reduction
at low cost is possible.  Financing for this benefit could come from  reducing expenditures
on uiitargeted  categorical  benefits and energy subsidies.  Low income countries may find
that implementing a full means-tested  cash benefit system  is too costly and administratively
complex,  although  it should be noted that Armenia and Albania have both implemented
progiams  successfully.  These countries may wish to try less complex solutions such as
distri  uting food rations through schools or school feeding programs.  Fee waivers or subsidies
to ir-prcve access to social services for the poor could also be helpful.
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